The Queen v A L [2016] VSCA 156
How do you interpret everyday words in a statute when they also have a specialised trade or technical meaning? Normally words take their ordinary meaning – particularly since parliament can define a word if it is meant to have a special meaning1. However, context, phrasing or subject matter may show …
Military Rehabilitation v May [2016] HCA 19
This case (at [52]) reminds us that when a judge explains what statutory words mean, their reformulation cannot be substituted for those words and construed as if it were the statutory text3. Unlike statutes, the meaning of judgments isn’t found by analysing the specific words used by the judge. Instead, read …
Duffy v Authority [2016] NSWSC 1062
If a provision refers to a specific thing, it may implicitly exclude other things of that type, especially if similar parts of the Act do mention those other things5. Here (at [41-42]), notice had to be given to ‘the licensee’. This meant no-one else needed to be notified, since different provisions did …
H v Commissioner of Police [2016] SADC 64
Always search for an interpretation that gives all the words of a provision some meaning and effect and doesn’t make any of them redundant10. This doesn’t mean every word has to change the provision’s scope or operation – some could have a limited effect, and Parliament may have intended others …
The purposive revolution was actually a parallel shift in both common law and statute. One week before s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 commenced, the High Court said that ‘[t]he fundamental object of statutory construction … is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument [and] legitimate aids to construction’1.
Since …
Chapman-Davis v NSW [2015] NSWIC 10
Extrinsic materials, such as second reading speeches and explanatory memoranda, can be helpful but should be used with care. This case (at [144-148]) notes that extrinsic materials may help you find the purpose or object of a provision3, although this must also be supported by the words of the statute4. …
Onebev v Encore Beverages [2016] VSC 284
‘And’ and ‘or’ usually take their plain meaning. ‘And’ is conjunctive and combines items in a provision, while ‘or’ is disjunctive and creates alternatives. However, ‘and’ is sometimes read as ‘or’ (and vice versa) if there is a clear drafting or printing error, or if context shows the other meaning was intended7…
AS v Minister [2016] VSC 351
Words like ‘must’, ‘shall’ or ‘required’ normally impose a mandatory duty and remove discretion8, but as always, this is subject to contrary intention9. While there is no fixed formula, consider whether failing to comply would defeat the Act’s purpose. If so, the provision may be compulsory10.
In this …
Traditionally, there was a view that tax Acts ‘should receive a strict construction’1. Hill J said it would be ‘a sad day’ if the rule were abandoned, as this could lead to ‘sloppy drafting’2. Kirby J disagreed, famously saying that a tax Act is ‘just another statute’3.
Where are we now on this? With …
FCT v Jayasinghe[2016] FCAFC 79
In this case, Allsop CJ emphasises (at [3-12]) that statutory words need not be ambiguous on their face before their context may be examined6. Words cannot be construed in isolation, and context (in its widest sense) must be considered straight away7.
At the same time, Allsop CJ warns against giving …
