Director v Adams [2015] FCA 828
For general purposes, notes are now part of the Act10, as this case reminds us (at [30-31]). Notes in tax legislation, however, may be subject to special rules11. They are part of the Act, but do not have the status of ‘explanatory sections’ or ‘guides’. This begs the question – …
GHP 104 160 689 v FCT [2014] AATA 515
iNOW! has now covered a range of important interpretation themes. This little R&D case on ‘feedstock expenditure’ conveniently discusses several of them (at [166]) – importance of the text; the Act as a whole; context and purpose; policy issues (especially preconceived policy); composite expressions (see above); and statutory definitions.
A good …
Skyy Spirits v Lodestar [2015] FCA 509
In 2010, the High Court said you shouldn’t look at extrinsic materials ‘before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction’2. Perram J took this as signalling some shift away from the settled idea that we are to look at context in the widest sense upfront.
Now, in Skyy …
EHL Burgess Properties v CSR [2015] VSC 295
This case reminds us (at [67]) that you can’t use regulations to interpret the Act they are made under. Otherwise, it ‘would be a case of the tail wagging the dog’3. One exception here is where the Act is expressly made subject to the regs.
Also, where the Act and …
LM v K Lawyers (No 2) [2015] WASC 245
When parliament uses different language to express an idea, it usually intends a different meaning. This is particularly so, said the court (at [18]), where ‘a long-established form of words’ is abandoned.
However, with mass-migration of provisions from ITAA36, s 1-3(2) of ITAA97 preserves original meaning where the same idea is …
Matthews v The Tap Inn [2015] SADC 108
Phrases in legislation like ‘is taken to be’ create a deeming provision, as this case notes (at [19]). Deeming provisions usually involve a ‘statutory fiction’ – a legal version of ‘let’s pretend’ – but only where the facts required are first made out7. They come in various guises – ‘deemed …
Plaintiff B15a v Minister [2015] HCA 24
If words of an Act are in the singular, they are presumed to include the plural (and vice versa) unless a contrary intention appears – see s 23 of the Acts Interpretation Act 19011.
In this High Court case, however, Kiefel J (at [8]) rejected the idea that ‘a parent’ should …
Task Technology v FCT [2014] FCAFC 113
This case, which is about software royalties under the Canadian double tax agreement, makes 4 key points – (1) take a ‘holistic’ approach to DTA interpretation2; (2) give primacy to the written text; (3) context, object and purpose ‘must also be considered’3; and (4) the OECD commentary and related …
Carroll v Secretary [2015] VSCA 156
Does a word used many times in an Act always have the same meaning? Not necessarily. The presumption that words are used consistently depends on context6. In this case (at [22]) the presumption was applied, consistent with the clear meaning of the text and its structure.
The presumption is given less weight …
In Episode 2, we emphasised that interpretation must always start with the text. However, black letter approaches [that is – narrow, acontextual or literalistic ones] are inconsistent with the purposive approach required by parliament8 and the High Court since 1981. Changes made at that time sounded the death knell for the black letter literalism of the Barwick era9…
