The purposive revolution was actually a parallel shift in both common law and statute. One week before s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 commenced, the High Court said that ‘[t]he fundamental object of statutory construction … is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument [and] legitimate aids to construction’1.
Since …
Chapman-Davis v NSW [2015] NSWIC 10
Extrinsic materials, such as second reading speeches and explanatory memoranda, can be helpful but should be used with care. This case (at [144-148]) notes that extrinsic materials may help you find the purpose or object of a provision3, although this must also be supported by the words of the statute4. …
Onebev v Encore Beverages [2016] VSC 284
‘And’ and ‘or’ usually take their plain meaning. ‘And’ is conjunctive and combines items in a provision, while ‘or’ is disjunctive and creates alternatives. However, ‘and’ is sometimes read as ‘or’ (and vice versa) if there is a clear drafting or printing error, or if context shows the other meaning was intended7…
AS v Minister [2016] VSC 351
Words like ‘must’, ‘shall’ or ‘required’ normally impose a mandatory duty and remove discretion8, but as always, this is subject to contrary intention9. While there is no fixed formula, consider whether failing to comply would defeat the Act’s purpose. If so, the provision may be compulsory10.
In this …
iNOW! began as a way to address the need – recognised by top judges – for those working with legislation to get better at reading it. Yet, stand-alone interpretation courses are still not taught in universities and, of course, reading statutes is not just the playground of the legally trained. Instead, people pick up the skills by osmosis, by …
Traditionally, there was a view that tax Acts ‘should receive a strict construction’1. Hill J said it would be ‘a sad day’ if the rule were abandoned, as this could lead to ‘sloppy drafting’2. Kirby J disagreed, famously saying that a tax Act is ‘just another statute’3.
Where are we now on this? With …
FCT v Jayasinghe[2016] FCAFC 79
In this case, Allsop CJ emphasises (at [3-12]) that statutory words need not be ambiguous on their face before their context may be examined6. Words cannot be construed in isolation, and context (in its widest sense) must be considered straight away7.
At the same time, Allsop CJ warns against giving …
Numo Pty Ltd v CSR [2016] VSC 274
Episode 7 said that Acts which change legal rights or liabilities are presumed not to apply retrospectively. This case says further (at [47-51]) that the presumption chiefly applies to Acts that change the law, not the exercise of existing statutory powers10.
The Commissioner had exercised a statutory discretion to group …
Totten v Secretary [2016] AATA 240
If a specific provision conflicts with a more general one in the same or an earlier statute, there is a general rule that the specific provision prevails. However, the conflict must first be completely irreconcilable11, as all words of an Act should be given effect where possible12.
In this case …
iNOW! has noted the ‘constructional choices’ that may emerge in zones of contested interpretation. Two things are usually necessary to bring forward those choices. First, a working knowledge of the principles for determining what parliament meant by the words it used. Second, a mindset to apply those principles flexibly and with understanding. Courts tell us to be ‘wary …
