Sea Shepherd v FCT [2013] FCAFC 68 

Composite expressions must be read as a whole, not pulled apart word-by-word against a dictionary then re-assembled out of context.  Gordon J (at [35]) cautioned against this kind of ‘atomised analysis’ in remarks which were later drawn to attention in her swearing in as a High Court judge³. 

The point about …

Taylor v Owners Strata Plan [2014] HCA 9

Reading words into statutes used to be right up there next to heresy⁷.  With the movement to purposive interpretation, however, things began to change – first in the UK⁸, then later here⁹. 

The High Court in Taylor (at [35-40]) confirms that words can be read into …

Director v Adams [2015] FCA 828

For general purposes, notes are now part of the Act¹⁰, as this case reminds us (at [30-31]).  Notes in tax legislation, however, may be subject to special rules¹¹.  They are part of the Act, but do not have the status of ‘explanatory sections’ or ‘guides’.  This begs the question – …

GHP 104 160 689 v FCT [2014] AATA 515

iNOW! has now covered a range of important interpretation themes.  This little R&D case on ‘feedstock expenditure’ conveniently discusses several of them (at [166]) – importance of the text; the Act as a whole; context and purpose; policy issues (especially preconceived policy); composite expressions (see above); and statutory definitions. 

A good …

Skyy Spirits v Lodestar [2015] FCA 509

In 2010, the High Court said you shouldn’t look at extrinsic materials ‘before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction’².  Perram J took this as signalling some shift away from the settled idea that we are to look at context in the widest sense upfront. 

Now, in Skyy …

EHL Burgess Properties v CSR [2015] VSC 295

This case reminds us (at [67]) that you can’t use regulations to interpret the Act they are made under.  Otherwise, it ‘would be a case of the tail wagging the dog’³.  One exception here is where the Act is expressly made subject to the regs. 

Also, where the Act and …

LM v K Lawyers (No 2) [2015] WASC 245

When parliament uses different language to express an idea, it usually intends a different meaning.  This is particularly so, said the court (at [18]), where ‘a long-established form of words’ is abandoned. 

However, with mass-migration of provisions from ITAA36, s 1-3(2) of ITAA97 preserves original meaning where the same idea is …

Matthews v The Tap Inn [2015] SADC 108

Phrases in legislation like ‘is taken to be’ create a deeming provision, as this case notes (at [19]).  Deeming provisions usually involve a ‘statutory fiction’ – a legal version of ‘let’s pretend’ – but only where the facts required are first made out⁷.  They come in various guises – ‘deemed …